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The Italian electric supplying activity has been concentrated in the hands of a State company 
(ENEL) since 1963, when private firms were nationalised. Since then, for nearly three decades 
the sector has been run under a nearly absolute monopoly. Tire first innovations were approved 
in 1982, but only in 1990 were some exceptions introduced which proved to be of some practical 
relevance.
At present ENEL is still the strategic (both for management and planning) core of tire sector, 
although private operators have been given some spaces in electricity production. In such a 
concentrated situation, a complex regulatory system was not needed, nor was an independent 
body for coordination, control and planning considered necessary.
From an international point of view, the sector is now undergoing a quick and radical process 
towards a more competitive structure. Building up a probable scenario even for the near future 
would be an extremely hard job, because the only tiling which seems to be clear is that ENEL is 
going to be privatised in a short while. But how this is going to happen cannot be easily forecast. 
Three main options could emerge: a) ENEL could be transformed into a private monopolist acting 
under regulation, b) The firm could be vertically disintegrated, with the birth of many firms, active 
at the different stages of the electricity supply activity, c) ENEL could be divided geographically 
into a number of vertically integrated firms, acting as regional monopolists. Within this process 
of change, great attention should be paid to make Italian regulation more compliant with EC rules 
than it is now.
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1. Introduction
Energy supply is a fundamental resource for any economy, and within this sector the electee 
suppfy industry has a great role. This is true in particular for Italy. The weight o f this source 
is rising and becoming more and more important, but the country imports nearly 15 A  ofits 
needs ^electricity, because of insufficent production capacity, even though this problem s 
likely to be solved in the future, and of cheaper foreign prices; moreover the generation mix 
is not sufficiently diversified and rates (taxes included) are among the highest in the EC 
explanation of this situation, besides structural aspects, such as the withdrawal from nuclear 
production, can also be found in Italian regulation that used the tanf system as an instrum 
to redistribute income and, moreover, began only a short time ago a slow process of cha g 
to induce more competition.
During the last decade some opportunities have been introduced in favour of self-produce 
and municipalities. Now it is common opinion that the only company that has been ruming 
the sector as a monopolist since 1963 (ENEL), is certainly going to be privatised soon. V ^at 
on the other hand is not clear at all, is how this privatisation will take place. Policy makers 
are arguing about deregulation because some of them believe that vertical integration 
economies could be insufficient to cover the cost inefficiencies associated with a regulated 
monopoly. Furthermore, new technologies, such as the combined cycle gas turbine, require 
a lower capital to set up a new plant and guarantee good efficiency m generation with a smaller
^ p re se n t the regulation of the electric supply industry in Italy must be exanimed 
a static well defined situation, but in the context of strong changes The country is 
undergoing a moment o f political instability, and is actually ruled by a transitory government, 
made up of “tecnicians”. Anyway there is a wide consensus, even though not unanimity, o
i i i a v a w  ^ --------- -------------- ✓  -
^e^^c^reofthrpaper broadly reflects the two stage debate charactemingltalwnp l^icy^
regulation o f present monopoly and new opportunities of deregulation, that are,
Thu^afte^ abrief2 *5iescription o°f the historical background, section 2 examines the evolution 
from a deregulated situation to a public monopoly. Section 3 focuses on the trends in present 
evolution, describing the pattern o f policy in the last decade , and changes t* *  
be introduced in the near future. Section 4 contains some indications about the bodies m 
charge ofregulations in Italy. Section 5 explains regulatory rules m production, transmission, 
distribution, tariffs, and some informal mechanisms o f control. In section 6 we try to verify 
the degree o f coherence of Italian situation with EC policy and regulation. Finally, the last 
section contains some concluding comments and some tentative policy recommendations.
2. Historical background
Italy has followed for the electric sector the same historical path which can be observed in
other industrialised countries, passing from a deregulated situation to a public monopoly , and
beginning in recent years a gradual process of deregulation and openmg towards private 
operators. But all these phases have taken place with a delay of some years if compared 
other European countries. In particular nationalisation took place more than fifteen years 
later than in France and in the United Kingdom.
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This happened because the debate on the advantages and foundations o f nationalisation, 
which in other countries was soon deviated towards the mechanisms regulating the market 
and income distribution, lasted throughout the Fifties.
Before nationalisation occurred, the electric sector in Italy had a rather complex structure. 
Production was shared between self-producers (29%), and a huge number o f elettro- 
commerciali (1.400). Despite the high number this last group was very concentrated, with 
the first six firms controlling 55% o f total capacity, council owned firms accounting for 
another 7%, and minor firms being limited to the remaining part of the market (9%). The six 
leading firms were organised as both industrial and financial holdings; they directly managed 
production and high voltage transmission, while distribution was left to consociated firms. 
Two of these firms were already State controlled. The elettro-commerciali firms operated 
in conditions very close to monopoly; their activity was subject to State concession, but the 
system lacked effective control and programming instruments.
There were 46 council firms (in 1962), which mainly distributed energy purchased by 
“electro-commercial” firms, even though some of them also had a complete cycle of 
production and distribution. Although their role proved very important in the areas in which 
they were active, because they induced a positive competitive process, it remained limited 
to few cases (above all if compared to the German case). The explanation of this is based on 
the lack of financial means necessary to start this activity.
Nationalisation took place in 1963, and concentrated all sectoral activities in one public 
company, ENEL, with the exception o f municipal utilities, o f self-producers already existing 
before nationalisation and having a share o f self-consumption greater than 70% (to be 
reached within three years), and very small producers and distributors with a production o f 
less than 15 GWh per year. This situation has lasted for nearly three decades, with an 
increasing role held by ENEL. In fact there has been a reduction in the share o f self-producers, 
replaced by the public company activity. During this period ENEL took on abig rationalisation 
process. It had inherited from the nationalised firms a very unhomogeneous situation, as far 
as size, style o f management and plant efficiency are concerned, but the greatest discrepancies 
could be found in the diffusion and quality of services offered in different areas. Tariffs have 
been equalised all over the country, and efficiency, both in production and distribution, has 
been increased.
3. Trends in present evolution
The situation described previously o f absolute public monopoly lasted up to 1982, when law 
308, intended as an instrument to promote energy saving and production from renewable 
sources, began a process ofchange. With this lawprivate operators were allowed to produce 
electricity, and were only obliged to sell their surplus to ENEL. But the expectations raised 
from this innovation were to be disappointed. The complex bureaucratic procedures to get 
a concession outweighted the very limited incentives; energy exchanges between societies 
ofthe same group were not allowed, and, above all, prices paid for electric surplus were too 
low, insufficient to cover production costs. These were all concrete obstacles which 
hampered the success o f this law.
More recently, in 1991, laws 9 and 10 have progressed further, in the same direction, with 
more radical changes. The most interesting innovations brought to the previous regulation 
are the following;
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Private producers are no longer obliged to have a share of self-consumption greater 
than 70%;
Electricity surplus must still be sold exclusively to ENEL, but electricity exchanges 
can take place between firms o f the same group; sales to private operators are not 
allowed;
The price of transferring this surplus is quite interesting for the producers;
There has been a complete liberalisation o f production by renewable sources, and by 
co-generation o f electricity and heat. The maximum capacity limitation has been 
cancelled;
Energy produced by renewable sources can also be freely exchanged between electric 
firms controlled by municipalities, between firms in which municipalities (or their 
controlled firms) have an interest, and between consortia or the firms belonging to 
them.
In short, it can be observed that these laws, as far as the electric sector is concerned, were 
intended to introduce marginal, but non irrelevant, elements o f privatisation, maintaining in 
the meanwhile the full strategic control and responsibility in the hands of ENEL. In fact, it 
must be considered that the requests for authorisation ofnew power capacity come to about
8.000 MW, and 5.000 MW have already been authorised so far.
The last legislative measure that concerns the electric sector is lawn0 359 of 1992, which gave 
ENEL the status of S.p.A, that is a stock company. This formal transformation can have 
practical operative implications, regarding strategies and finance, but they depend heavily on 
the contents of the Concession of the government to ENEL, which has not been approved 
yet. In fact as a stock company ENEL maintains all the monopolistic power it had previously, 
and the situation will remain unchanged until the approval of the new act o f concession. The 
contents of the proposal of concession, which has been in discussion in the first months of 
1994, are very interesting to understand what could be a possible scenario for future years. 
Of course nothing ensures that, especially after the political changes that are taking place at 
present, politicians could take on a completely different view regarding the electric sector 
regulation.
The concession should regulate relations between the government and ENEL. In the case of 
privatisation this act becomes very important because investors need a precise framework 
about behavioural opportunities o f this company. The most significant points o f this 
concession are the following:
ENEL has the exclusive right to manage production, import-export, transport, 
transformation and distribution. The right concerns all activities reserved to ENEL by 
present laws;
ENEL will have the task o f coordinating all the electricity industry in Italy. In particular, 
the activity o f every operator will be subject to a contract drawn up between ENEL 
and the association of self producers. The company will have the possibility to diversify 
the activity but the electric service must maintain the priority; 
a contract between ENEL and the government, called Contralto di Programma 
(programming contract), will define long-term company goals. The goals will have to 
be coherent with a good quality and efficiency of the service and the strategic 
development o f the industry;
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the concession will be free of charge and will last 99 years;
general interests of the country may allowthe government to modify and also to revoke
the concession.
The proposal of concession has not been approved y e t, but the question will come up again 
on the government agenda, when the decision to privatise will become operative. Many 
perplexities arose, in the debate on the concession, which may cause important variations. 
As we have seen above, the condition o f monopoly would be confirmed for 99 years , would 
be free of charge and ENEL would have a large choice o f managing strategies for the 
industry. ENEL would also enjoy special privileges that in the past were given to the state 
firm. These concern free concessions about building rights and priority rights about research 
in the geothermic sector and renewable sources.
At present, political debate is dominated by the discussion about the opportunity to go on 
with a monopoly condition. In fact, the industrial board association proposes a division 
between production and distribution, whereas other political forces ask for the creation of 
few regional firms. In particular the industrial board insists on the importance of creating 
competition and of creating different societies active at different stages o f production and 
supply. So if the actual situation imposes at present to privatise ENEL as a sole society, the 
Parliament must be careful to prevent any future obstacle towards liberalisation. For this 
reason the board suggests to grant three separate concessions, instead o f one, and above all 
to grant no exclusive concession, to allow the existence of competitors.
In the short term, the solution of maintaining the monopoly condition might be accepted but 
in this case it would be necessary to reconsider a public ownership. A sole society can enjoy 
advantages of vertical integrated process, can plan long term investments with a single 
strategy and obtain scale economies. But there are, on the other hand, many disadvantages 
too. Competition doesn’t exist and there are extremely weak opportunities to improve 
efficiency. This can be forecast because other experiences in Europe show that it is easier to 
get a profit by practicing a monopolistic price than by reducing costs. The large size o f the 
firm could give the management a strong market power and would make it difficult for self 
producers to become real competitors in the future. Anyway the monopolistic power of 
ENEL will be reduced at the time in which an European market for energy will be created. 
In order to control for electricity industry productivity, new systems o f calculating the rates 
are going to be introduced. A price-cap system could bring about a recovery o f efficiency 
but the absence of market competition doesn’t enable to verify if they are fixed at the correct 
level.
If  the decision is to keep a sole agent, the constitution of a very strong authority becomes 
very important. Without a strict control it is difficult to think that a public company operating 
as a monopolist could be more efficient than a state company.
All these reasons turn the debate towards other opportunities. As we have seen above, the 
most appreciated alternatives concern the division of the ENEL company into separate firms. 
The first opportunity, the one which is attracting increasing interest, concerns a new 
organisation o f the sector by creating many different societies operating in production, 
transportation, intended as a common carriage activity, and distribution. The production 
structure would be composed of a few operators (4-5) supplying the distributors in high 
tension and working in competition with foreign companies too.
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transportation state company. The society could also manage hydroelectric plants that are 
regulated by particular laws regarding the concession of water. Common carrier would also 
have the responsibility of indicating working priorities ofplants, that must be activated under 
conditions of minor operating costs within the different producer firms.
Distribution of energy could be shared between a few regional firms. Their number could be 
high (10-15), because there aren’t particular scale economies that could lead to a reduction 
in the number o f distributors. They would have the task of defining purchasing contracts 
with producers, and supplying domestic consumers and firms.
A second opportunity concerns the division o f ENEL, setting up a limited number of 
vertically integrated firms, operating as regional monopolists. In this case too, the high 
voltage grid, together with the hydroelectric central management, could be granted to a State 
firm.
This hypothesis would bring about vertical integration economies, but would also mean the 
impossibility to introduce true deregulation and competition. However the presence of more 
than one operator, could offer the opportunity of cross-sectional comparisons, which are 
useful when you have to fix rates, quality standards, pollution standards. It would also be 
possible to overcome the problems that in many countries arise from the separation between 
producers and distributors: the difficulty to define a correct strategic planning o f investments, 
and to coordinate the operators. A limited number of vertically integrated firms would 
involve more coordination as regards the government goals to increase production provision 
sources diversification.
This second solution could also have financial advantages. A better evaluation of ENEL 
equity would in fact be possible. This would make it easier to privatise the sector, also because 
sales on the stock market could be delayed over a longer period, avoiding financial shocks.
4. Attribution of functions and decisional power
The final responsibility for the elctric sector, lacking a single independent body, acting as a 
regulator, is attributed to the Ministry oflndustry, which is the true regulatory body in Italy. 
Up to 1994 there were other administrative structures which had a competence on the electric 
sector, and which had above all price regulation functions.
The first of these bodies w’as the CIP (Interdepartmental Committee for Prices), which has 
above all price regulation functions. The areas of competence ofthisbody comprehend tariff 
determination, and the fixation ofthe prices ofsome goods (drugs, oil products, newspapers, 
etc.). To decide prices and tariffs, CIP follows procedures specific for each product and 
service. These procedures were controlled by an other body, the Central Commission for 
Prices, which was composed not only o f delegates of the departments which composed the 
CIP,but also of representatives ofISTAT (the Italian Statistical Office) and ofsocial parties 
(trade unions, trade associations, consumer organisations).
However tariff fixation for electricity was not solely responsibility of CIP. A part ofthe price 
paid by the consumer, called thermic surcharge and intended to cover increases in variable 
costs due to rises in oil prices, is determined directly by the Ministry of Industry. This 
surcharge, together with all other extra charges fixed by the CIP, are paid by all consumers, 
also those served by municipal firms, to a separate body, the Cassa Conguaglio per il 
Settore Elettrico (Balance Fund for the Electric Sector). The funds collected are then
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transferred to the firms which use fossil fuel. Its function is justified by the necessity of 
balancing different production cost structures of firms active in different areas, in presence 
of equal tariffs on the whole national territory, and so avoiding losses or extra- profits.
At a local level price competence was attributed to the CPP (Provincial Committees for 
Prices). As electric tariffs have been unified, their function in this field was limited to 
supervision and control.
The second relevant body (actually still in charge) is the CIPE (Interdepartmental Committee 
for Economic Policy), which, having a task of general political planning, also has of course 
the task of dealing with energetic matters.
Among its various tasks, the CIPE must in fact supervise general strategies, for example on 
investments, of State owned companies (ENEL is one of these); more over it has a 
programming function on the national supplying policy, of which, given the nearly complete 
lack o f national sources, energetic products represent one of the main objects.
After the abolition o f CIP and of Central Commission for Prices, price responsibility is up 
to the Ministry o f Industry, and in particular to the Diretion for Energy Sources. This 
competence is transitory, and will be transferred to the authority that, by law, must be created 
before privatisation.
How the system works, in a set up of public monopoly has been described above. Now that 
public utilities are going to be privatised, it is of course necessary to have a reform of the 
system ofregulation and control. Parliament is now debating this new asset, and the tendency 
is towards a single body responsible for electricity and gas, while other bodies will be created 
for the remaining utilities.
5. Structure of the sector, formal regulatory rules and mechanisms
5.1 Production
As has been seen above, there are four kind of operators active in power production; ENEL, 
municipal firms, self-producers and independent producers. .
ENEL is o f course the main producer; in 1993 its production represented 81.1% of total 
national output. The introduction of laws 9 and 10 1991 will bring about a reduction of this 
share, which in 1990 had a value of 83.6%, but the effect cannot be felt yet, because the first 
requests have begun to be authorised just a short time ago. We are however still far from 
a strong tendency tow'ards competition, and production is still much more concentrated than 
the situation ante nationalisation. In 1960 the firms which were going to be incorporated in 
ENEL represented 74.3% of national production.
This concentration in production results in ENEL being a large producer, placed only after 
the French EdF (a country in which production has an even more concentrated structure) in 
the European ranking, and at the third place in the world ranking, as far as power capacity 
is concerned.
It is organised as a vertically integrated structure, responsible for all the three main phases 
of which the service is composed, production, transmission and distribution. It is composed 
o f a central unit controlling several local offices. The central unit has a coordination function, 
and provides for those functions which can not be decentralised, such as planning, research, 
allocation, engineering and building of new plants and finance. Local units are on the other 
hand in charge o f all the operative functions of the electric service.
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Table 1 - Structure of Production and Distribution of Electricity in Italy
Production Distribution
1960 1990 1992 1990 1992
ENEL 74.3 83.6 81.1 92.7 87.1
Municipal
utilities 5.9 3.5 4.1 7.0 12.5
Small and 
self producers 11.8 12.9 14.8 0.3 0.4
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: ENEL
The municipal electrical firms operate on a restricted geographical basis, limited to one town 
and some municipal districts in the surroundings. There are 56 o f them and they provide to 
the needs o f 195 municipalities. Not all ofthem have a complete cycle ofproduction, and their 
share o f national production is not so great: on average in 1993 they account for 4.1% of 
national output. Their presence is concentrated in the North o f Italy, with the only big 
exception o f Rome. 94.2% of the power produced from municipal firms comes from the 
Northern Regions, 3.9% from the Central ones, and only 1.8% from the South. This uneven 
geographical distribution means that the low average value hides very different roles played 
by this category o f producers at a local level. In fact municipal producers in some regions 
account for a relevant share o f electricity locally produced; the highest values are reached 
in Piedmont (19%) and Lombardy (15%).
Small producers are firms with private ownership. Up to the end of 1990 they had to limit 
their production within the boundaries o f 15 G Wh per year, or o f 40 GWh if obtained from 
renewable sources. For this reason their weight on national output was very limited, lower 
than 1%. Hydroelectric power represents the majority o f this production.
Self producers were obliged, up to 1990, to have a share o f self consumption greater than 
70%. This limitation has been repealed, and procedures to get the concession have been 
simplified. Their share on national output, which is not at all irrelevant, has shown a slight 
increase, passing from 12.9% in 1990, to 14.8% in 1993. Experts working inside the 
Department of Industry think that the greatest increases in Italian power capacity in the near 
(and even middle) future are likely to come from independent producers. The quantitative 
relevance private producers can have on national capacity in a near future, when all 
authorisations for new plants (8.000 MW) will be granted, has been indicated above. 
Nevertheless this development will depend heavily on ENEL’s attitudes to act as a carrier 
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The expansion o f capacity is one of the greatest problems Italy has faced till now. Italy is in 
fact the only country in the EC to present a great negative disequilibrium.
Table 2 - Electricity Balance for Italy (1992 - Gwh)
SOURCES 245,434 USES 245,434
Hydroelectric pr. 45,787 Agriculture 4,331
Thermoelectric pr. 176,997 Industry 120,561
Geothermic pr. 3,459 Services 47,377
Domestic uses 55,739
Total gross production 226,243 Total consumption 228,008
Power employed in pr. 16,756 Losses 16,779
Total net production 209,487
Imports 35,947 Exports 647
Source: ENEL balance sheet for 1992
As can be seen in table 2, imports represent nearly 15% o f total sources. This situation 
originated historically from the poor Italian energy sources stock, but above all from the 
withdrawal from nuclear production. Such a heavy import dependence for electricity should 
be reduced with a strong investment planning, both by ENEL and by private producers. 
Italian disequilibrium in production doesn’t come only from insufficient capacity, but also 
from territorial plant distribution. Table 3 shows in fact big regional discrepancies between 
local production and needs. The consequences are an overcharge of high voltage lines and 
a great incidence of losses, even if Italian efficiency in transmission is comparable to the best 
E.C. countries.
It is interesting to notice the great regional and local differences. The Southern regions are 
the ones which show the greatest deficit, expressed as a share on electricity demand, while 
the greatest absolute deficit can be found in the Northern Regions. Only in the two islands 
there is a surplus. Going more into detail, in the North of Italy positive balances are typical 
o f regions characterised by high hydroelectrical production and low industrialisation rates. 
On the other hand the most industrialised (Lombardy, Piedmont and Emilia Romagna) 
regions show that local production can not cover the needs. The second region in particular 
shows a particularly high deficit (a reason for this can be found in the closeness to the French 
border, through which most imports enter Italy). Similar great differences can be found in 
all the big areas in which Italian territory is traditionally divided.
9
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Table 3 - REGIONAL PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION OF ELECTRICITY 
IN ITALY (1991 - Gwh)
Production Consumption Balance Share of balance 
on demand (%)
Piedmont 9,007 21,560 -12,553 -58.2
Val d’Aosta 2,849 867 1,982 228.6
Lombardy 33,442 50,106 -16,664 -33.3
Trentino A.A. 9,055 4,420 4,635 104.9
Veneto 22,712 22,334 378 1.7
Friuli-Venezia G. 6,244 6,715 -471 -7.0
Liguria 15,461 6,410 9,051 141.2
Emilia Romagna 11,988 17,875 -5,887 -32.9
Northern Italy 110,758 130,323 19,565 -15.0
Tuscany 13,770 15,986 -2,126 -13.3
Umbria 2,403 4,441 -2,038 -45.9
Marche 983 4,814 -3,831 -79.6
Latium 20,057 18,186 1,871 10.3
Central Italy 37,213 43,337 -6,124 -14.1
Abruzzo 1,925 4,540 -1,925 -42.4
Molise 307 897 -590 -65.8
Campania 3,339 14,794 -11,455 -77.4
Puglia 13,319 13,606 -287 -2.1
Basilicata 546 1,647 -1,101 -66.8
Calabria 9,534 5,168 4,366 84.5
Southern Italy 28,970 40,625 -11,682 -28.8
Sicily 19,496 16,830 2,666 15.8
Sardinia 9,450 9,827 377 -3.8
Islands 28,946 26,657 2,289 8.6
Italy 205,887 240,969 -35,082 -14.6
Source: ENEL
Looking at the regulation o f electric energy production established by laws 9 and 10 of 1992, 
private firms can now generate power for their own use or for sale to ENEL, after getting 
a licence from the Ministry o f Industry. As a consequence after the introduction of this law 
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concerned. Small producers do exist as a separate category, since they are also allowed to 
supply electricity. The Ministry can also authorise the expansion of existing plants, or the 
construction of new ones. Private producers can use the power generated also for societies 
belonging to the same group, but arc obliged to sell their surplus to ENEL.
All the following matters are to be regulated by specific agreements between ENEL and the 
firm:
transfer of power to ENEL; 
contract supplies for ENEL; 
common carriage; 
exchanges of power.
The agreements will be bound to follow special directives o f the Ministry of Industry, which 
will take into account the technical feasibility of the named operations, and public service 
needs.
Prices for all these operations will be decided by CIP, on the basis o f the “principle of avoided 
costs” (plus some incentives for hydroelectric and renewable productoin). They are up-dated 
at least once every two years. The principle of avoided costs allows ENEL to pay electricity 
not on the basis o f the average costs o f self-producers, but o f  its real cost saving. Price is 
divided into three components: plant costs, operative costs and fuel costs, corresponding to 
something less than the average costs for ENEL. In the cases in which a time of sale rate is 
paid, the criterion is closer to a marginal cost price fixation principle, because plant costs are 
acknowledged only for peak hour supplies, while at other hours only fuel costs are 
acknowledged. The last measure now in force is the provision CIP n° 6/1992, which fixed 
very favourable conditions for electricity sales to ENEL.
Municipal firms can operate in all the fields o f electric service (production, transport, 
transformation, distribution and sale) under concession. Each firm will sign an agreement 
with ENEL, following an outline agreement issued from talks between ENEL and the trade 
association of council firms. This document must indicate rights and duties o f the parts, the 
instructions for coordination, causes which justify the failure o f  the contract, and the general 
criteria for the regulation o f sales, exchanges and common carriage. Both the general and the 
specific agreements are subject to the approval o f the Minister o f Industry.
Production ofpower from renewable sources is subject to a different regulation. Law 9 states 
in fact that ENEL has no exclusive right in this field, and thus no authorisation is needed to 
produce electricity from renewable sources, or employing techniques that are comparable, 
such as the combined production o f electricity and heat. Anyone who wants to install a new 
plant of this kind must only give communication o f his intent to the Ministry o f Industry, to 
ENEL, and to the fiscal bureau locally competent for taxes on buildings. Here again all the 
operations with ENEL are going to be regulated by particular agreements which will follow 
a general model approved by the Ministry after consulting the Regions. Prices are to be 
defined by CIP, which will establish incentives for this kind o f production, valid for the first 
eight years. Electricity produced from renewable sources is not limited to self consumption, 
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5.2 Transmission and distribution
The greatest share of high and medium voltage electricity transport is carried out by ENEL. 
ENEL owns 90% of the Italian network, while the remaining part is shared between municipal 
firms and self-producers. The management and coordination of the internal net is committed 
to a special body dependent on ENEL, the “Centro Nazionale di Controllo” (National 
Control Centre). It manages directly the 220/380 kV lines, and gives operational instruction 
to lower hierarchical bodies (compartmental divisions and peripherical control centres).
At an international level, on the 380kV network, the coordination function is accomplished 
by the UCPTE (Union for the Coordination of Production and of Transport of Electric 
Power).
Distribution to final consumers is also very concentrated in the hands of ENEL: it supplies 
87.1% of electricity consumed in Italy. The remaining part is supplied by municipal firms. 
Both ENEL and municipal firms have the fu 11 responsibility o f the areas in which they operate, 
so that at a local level they act o f course as monopolists. The borders of the areas of 
competence are decided on a case by case basis, by means of specific agreements.
There is also a marginal contribution given by small firms, that are also allowed to supply 
electricity if they produce (or purchase from ENEL) and then supply power within the limits 
of 15 millions Kwh per year. This limit is raised to 20 millions Kwh for firms operating in small 
islands, and to 40 millions Kwh, if the part exceeding 15 millions is obtained from renewable 
sources. All these values may be exceeded if power is supplied by firms that were already 
established when the law was approved exclusively in the council district to which the firms 
belong.
Municipal firms, and any other operator active in the distribution o f electricity must draw up 
a balance sheet in compliance with a model prepared by the Ministry oflndustry, must submit 
it to auditing, and get it approved by Regional authorities. Then the balance must be sent to 
the Ministry oflndustry.
5.3 Tariffs
Italian electrical tariffs have been unified over the whole national territory since 1961, that 
is evenbefore nationalisation took place. On the other hand they are differentiated onthe basis 
o f supplying characteristics: voltage level, subscribed demand and utilisation time. Tariffs 
depend also on the destination o f electricity purchased: domestic uses, public lighting, use 
in places other than homedwelling houses, and agricultural purposes.
Nearly all tariffs are composed of two parts: a demand charge depending on subscribed 
demand, and a price for electricity consumed.
Since 1974 the variable price of electricity has been split in turn into two parts: one intended 
to cover operating fixed costs ofelectricity production, the other, called thermal supplement, 
corresponding to the variable costs for fuel used in thermal production. This thermal 
supplement is charged on all customs, including those supplied by municipal firms. Its value 
depends on prices o f fuel employed in thermal power plants, and on prices and quantities of 
electricity imported. The thermal burden is collected by distributors and transferred to the 
Cassa Conguaglioper il Settore Elettrico (Electricity Sector Equalisation Fund), and they 
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This mechanism allows to maintain a sole tariff structure throughout the national territory, 
in presence o f firms with different cost structures, avoiding losses and extra-profits. But on 
the other side this acts as a disincentive for a wider use o f other sources.
Let’s now have a closer look to the structure o f tariffs by category o f user.
Lighting uses include the electricity employed by State bodies (Councils, Provincie, etc.) on 
roads and streets, in railway plants and stations, in ports and airports, and so on. Rates are 
different in the case o f regular supplies and of occasional supplies.
Domestic supplies, all carried out at low voltage, are those characterised by the most complex 
structure. They include all uses in private houses, and can also include uses in premises close 
to the dwelling house, provided there is a single delivery point and power is lower than 15 
kW. The customer can choose between different blocks o f subscribed demand: 1,5; 3; 6; 10 
kW and more, but the great majority o f users are concentrated in the first two classes These 
are the so called fascia sociale (social range). They are diversified depending on whether the 
house represents or not the main residence o f the family. Rates are strongly progressive (as 
opposed to other EC countries). The fascia sociale enjoys very favourable rates, as far as 
the fixed monthly charge, the cost per Kwh and the thermal supplement are concerned. Since 
these two classes include in reality not a small share of population, the poorest one, but more 
than 95% of all domestic customers, measures have been introduced to make this social range 
more selective. Benefits are now folly enjoyable only by monthly consumptions which do 
exceed 150 kWh for 1.5 kW uses, and 220 kWh for 3 kW uses. Beyonnd these limits benefits 
are progressively reduced as consumption increases.
Consumers using a power of 6 kW or more, can choose between a flat rate tariff and a day- 
night tariff. Daily hours are in this case divided into two ranges, corresponding to separate 
costs o f energy, while the thermal supplement remains the same. The intent is to offer this 
possibility of choice also to other categories of users progressively.
Agricultural uses enjoy favourable tariffs, depending on the use of electricity, season, and 
utilisation time.
Supplies to premises other than houses have different structures in the case o f low, medium 
and high voltage supplies. For low voltage, there are special rates for uses concentrated 
exclusively in low load hours. Two rate time-of-day tariffs have been introduced, as an 
experiment, for uses higher than 25 kW in agriculture and in food productions employing 
electrical ovens.
Time-of-day rates have been introduced for high and medium voltage industrial supplies, 
divided into two seasons and four hourly ranges. Apart from that, tariffs are digressive 
according to subscribed demand, electricity consumed and load factor.
To get the price paid by the user for electricity one must add to ENEL rates a complex system 
oftaxes. First o f all there is VAT (which can be recovered from non final consumers), which 
has a share o f 9% for extractive and manufacturing industries, and for domestic uses, and of 
19% for all other uses. Then there are different taxes which go to the Councils, the Provincie, 
and the central fiscal administration, which decrease as consumption grows, for professional 
uses, and increase for domestic uses. T axes are also higher for domestic use out of the house 
o f residence.
Fiscal imposition on industrial uses is extremely heavy (16% on average), while in other EC 
countries it is absent. For this reason industrial rates in Italy are the highest in industrialised 
countries (with some exceptions in some areas of Germany), and problems would arise in case 
o f harmonisation inside the EC.
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5.4 Mechanisms o f  strategic coordination
In Italy a formal regulation doesn’t exist, as far as mechanisms o f control are concerned. 
There are nevertheless two instruments which respond partly to this task: the “Contratto di 
Programma” (Programming Contract) and the “Principi su ll’Erogazione dei Servizi 
Pubblici' (Principles on public service supply, which is a sort of behavioural code). A wider 
range o f instruments will probably be available with the birth ofthe authority that will control 
the electric utilities.
The Contratto di Programma establishes the goals to be achieved in the electricity field and 
the instruments that have been created to allow the Ministry of Industry’s control. The 
present contract will last five years (1/1/91 - 31/12/95) and it covers the following topics: 
increase in production, energy saving, environment control, supply quality and operating 
efficiency, economic and financial equilibria.
In particular:
ENEL is prepared to guarantee a strong increase in power generating plants. During 
the five years indicated, it is going to build new plants with a new generation power 
o f about 5.000 Mw; among these, 1.000 will have to come from alternative energy 
sources.
As for energy saving, many actions have been put forward to improve thermic 
efficiency; the company is requested to lower the ratio fuel per unit o f production by 
1.5% between 1991 and 1995. Technological improvements are also required in 
transmission and distribution, to deliver electricity steadly at a low loss factor. 
Rigorous constraints have beendefined to control environmental pollution. During the 
period indicated above, ENEL has to make new investments to cut back SOx and NOx 
emissions by 8%.
ENEL has also to guarantee quality of the service and operating efficiency. More 
customer satisfaction and reduction of costs is necessary to obtain this result. The 
waiting period for connection of new customers must be reduced to 6 days by 1995. 
The possibility to sign the supply contract by phone and to pay invoices by credit card 
must be given too. By 1995, ENEL must reduce the number o f employees in order to 
obtain an increase in the number of customers per employee from 223 to 265. 
ENEL will have to obtain all the result described under the constraint o f financial and 
economic equilibria. Looking in that direction a rates adjustment system has been set 
up. It is quite similar to a price-cap mechanism. ENEL is allowed to adjust its tariffs 
according to the behaviour o f operating and financial costs, but the increases will be 
cut back, by an improvement in productivity, by 1.5 per year.
As we have seen, the contract signed by ENEL and the government is not a formal mechanism 
o f control but represents a binding commitment for the activity o f this firm. It sets some 
strategic goals for the country, ensuring an increase in power supply with a better generation 
mix and environmental protection and new energy sources. On the supply and customers side, 
it asks for quality and efficiency recovery. The real drawback of this system is the absence 
o f sanctions in the case of non execution.
The second instrument is contained in law 27/1/94, inherent to public service supply. It 
concerns all public utilities, but the electric sector is expressly underlined. It is stated in it that
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the service supplying activity must take into account all the following general principles: 
all customers have equal rights, which means that they must receive equal treatment 
in presence of equal supplying conditions, 
impartiality, that is objectiveness towards customers, 
continuity, so that supplying is continuous, regular and without interruptions, 
customers have right of choice of the supplier, where the monopoly condition should 
be abandoned.
customers may participate in quality evaluation 
efficiency and effectiveness in the management.
To reach these goals some instruments have been identified. All firms involved in public 
services supply must adopt them in the short term, acquiring all the necessary tools. As far 
as the electricity service is concerned, it seems important to underline the following specific 
instruments:
the adoption of quality standards to be verified by users by means of public meetings, 
simplified procedures to get access to the service.
consumers will be clearly informed as regards service supplying mechanisms, technical 
aspects, quality standard reached at the moment, energy saving, also by means of 
special offices.
service evaluation, by means o f sample inquiries, whose results will be the object of 
special publications.
refund and indemnification in case of disservice, when quality standards are not 
achieved.
Users should be safeguarded by means of special complaint procedures, which will have to 
be o f common knowledge. Moreover special internal offices will have the task o f evaluating 
consumers complaints, and of taking measures against defaulting employees. A committee 
will be created at the presidency of the Council o f Ministers, composed of three independent 
experts, which should be able to give judgments free from both political parties and company 
interests. It will have the task o f controlling that the named principles are correctly applied.
6. Degree of coherence with EC rules
As we want to verify the degree o f coherence ofthe Italian situation with EC regulation, we 
have to define the priority aspects proposed by the EC government. The EC emphasises the 
problem o f national monopolies or exclusive rights, the fiscal imposition on energy rates, the 
transparency o f costs, consumer prices and pollution control.
As far as the first aspect is concerned the Italian situation must be correctly analysed. It seems 
to be in conflict with 1 ° comma art.90 of the Treaty of Rome. This says that public firms, or 
those with special rights, can be given the opportunity o f avoiding the issue o f market 
competition.
In fact in March 1991, the EC Commission began legal proceedings against Italy, France, 
Spain, Holland, Ireland and Denmark. The opinion of the EC is that the maintenance by the 
public monopolies ofthe exclusive rights concerning electricity import-export works against
15
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the EC regulation on competition. The Italian government thought that the new law number 
9/92, which gave more opportunities to private companies would be sufficient as a reply to 
the Community. It must be said that the Italian government defends itself by referring to the 
art. 90 comma 2. It indicates that the regulations o f the Treaty o f Rome work for firms that 
manage public utilities under the limitation of the strategic interest of their activity. 
However Italy has tought, at least untill now, that the specific situation o f its country with 
regards to electricity needs to maintain the electricity supply united under the direction o f a 
sole operator. The efficiency in production could be stimulated by international competitive 
bidding, concerning investment in new power capacity and consequent management, as long 
as it is reciprocal, at an international level. It must be underlined that new producers are 
intended to have the possibility o f selling energy only to their subsidiaries or to the monopoly 
operator, ENEL.
The contrast with EC has not been solved yet. Freedom of electricity import-export with 
other EC operators is indicated as a condition to improve the efficiency o f this activity. At 
present this is the real Italian problem that must be solved with the EC. Recently Brussels has 
deferred Italy and the other countries above indicated to the European Justice Court. The 
ENEL monopoly is judged irregular as the exclusive right of exchanging energy with other 
countries is concerned.
The opinion of is that the EC, Art.90 comma 2 can not be considered as a support o f the 
electricity producers’ thesis: the guarantee of safety and an effective control of supplies is 
not considered sufficient to justify an import-export monopoly.
As for the subject ofrates, a comparison with other countries indicates that the average Italian 
price is quite high. Analysing the coherence with the EC framework, it can be seen that this 
situation depends heavily on the imposition system and the rate structure.
As far as fiscal law is concerned, we can see a substantial homogeneity in the case of domestic 
users. On the other hand industrial users are more heavily taxed that in the EC.
Industrial users have to accept heavy taxation (VAT excluded), about 16%, that, in general, 
does not exist in other European countries with the exception o f a few regions in Germany. 
This is a big problem for Italy. If we try to comply our system with EC rules we’ll have a 
reduction of fiscal revenues and electricity demand could increase our need to import.
The other peculiar characteristic of the Italian system concerns the structure of domestic 
rates. Italian rates are structured in a strongly progressive way while in the EC we have 
digressive rates. Electricity rates are still intended as an instrument of income policy and 
reduction of consumption.
On the other hand we can see a perfect coherence with EC directives regarding price and cost 
transparenency and environment control. Italy has the some prices all over the country and 
contracts and supplies conditions are managed with complete transparency. As for the costs, 
ENEL isis going to publish a balance sheet, giving information about the different costs of 
production and distribution.
Finally, with regards to pollution, we can see a great effort to comply Italian plant structure 
with the EC regulation. Since 1990, ENEL has invested almost six thousand billion ECU in 
this field. A heavy reduction o f emission of S 02 and NOx is a tangible result of this activity
still in progress.
Many countries in the EC started in advance but the recovery obtained in the early nineties, 
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7. Conclusions and evaluations
At present the main problems of the electric supply industry in Italy concern the structural 
weakness about energetic sources mix and the absence ofcompetition. Some other problems 
exist such as: the deficit o f internal power, the level and structure of rates, the different 
taxation o f industrial rates, compared to EC, and the delay in creating an authority or a set 
o f regulatory rules, but they are going to be solved, or have a strong connection with the 
solution o f the first problems indicated above.
Given such a context, what are the main items concerning regulation or deregulation in the 
near future?
The improvement of source mix needs a political and ideological change in favour ofnuclear 
power, which seems to be difficult to forecast in the short term. The problem ofcompetition 
seems on the other hand quite different. The decision concerning privatisation has been 
already taken, but how this privatisation will be carried out must still be decided: which stock 
company control? Which opportunities to improve competition?
Till now the government is considering changing with the creation of a private company and 
some opportunities for independent producers and municipalities. Increasing gradually the 
role of independent producers and of municipalities, that’s the idea! The present capital and 
rates incentives, or new instruments, such as competitive bidding to build and manage new 
power stations, should enlarge the market.
It is sure that new incentives are increasing the interest in building new power. It may be that 
the deficit of capacity will find a solution with a good presence of private companies, but in 
this way competition doesn’t work and the consumers have to bear higher rates. The creation 
o f new distributors, managed by societies owned by ENEL jointly with privates, could bring 
a slight improvement to the system. However if we want real competition, we have to open 
the market to imports. Municipal distributors, and all other distributors have to be allowed 
to buy electricity from abroad and from other Italian producers, which is also one ofEC aims. 
Contemporarily we have to cut the favourable rates planned in the case o f selling energy to 
ENEL, with the exception of renewable sources. This is one opportunity, but it takes a lot 
oftime to work. Ifwe cut such favourable rates, the interest of small private producers, with 
low scale economies in producing electricity will be reduced. To have competition in the short 
term, the most feasible thing is to separate production and distribution within ENEL, with 
the creation of some companies in both activities and a common carrier for transportation. 
It is obvious that the possibility o f imports must be accepted. The feasibility of this solution 
derives from present ENEL organisation. Already now, production is independent from 
distribution and transmission. Multiregional structures working in production and distribution 
have a self sufficient organisation and can easily become independent companies. Furthermore, 
the sum of the value of the new firms would be certainly greater than what the government 
could obtain by putting the State company on the stock market as just one society. This kind 
o f deregulation could also make the “authority” pay attention to the relations between costs 
and structure o f the rates, by creating more homogeneity respect to the EC.
At this moment, it is difficult to provide a ranking across the possible deregulation schemes. 
Inside Italy competitive bulk power markets could be feasible and could bring welfare gains. 
But this choice needs another reply. Is it better than a vertically integrated system, competing 
with other European producers in a market without import barriers? We are quite uncertain 
about the real dimension ofvertical economies between the generation and distribution stages 
o f  electricity supply. However we do have one certainty: mere privatisation without any form 
ofcompetition doesn’t mean more welfare for the consumers.
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